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DIRECTIONS (Qs. 106-113): Read the following passage carefully and answer the questions given below it.
The Kashmir issue remains a hydra-headed problem, one that is marked by a territorial controversy, an ideological dispute, the question of self-determination, militancy, and a human rights dimension. But one critical aspect of this multifaceted muddle that often escapes our attention has been the complexities arising out of sharing of common river water resources by the “distant” neighbours and the associated institutional mechanisms.
The Indus River Basin not only cradled one of the world’s oldest civilisations, but the survival and sustenance of sizable communities in contemporary Pakistan and India also remain critically dependent on the river and its tributaries. The Indus network constitutes the lifeline of Pakistan where more than 90per cent of the land is semi-arid and nearly half of the population is employed in the agricultural sector. The river nourishes the water-deficient states of north-western India, notably Punjab, the “bread basket of India”. It originates in the Tibetan Plateau and along with its tributaries flows through Jammu and Kashmir before entering Pakistan. Thus the Partition of 1947 called for a division not simply of land and people, but also of waterways thereby posing a formidablechallenge to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Chairman of the Border Commission. The dispute over sharing of Indus water came to the fore immediately after Partition because the existing irrigation canal head works remained in the Indian state of (East) Punjab, while the lands being irrigated by the river fell in Pakistan’s (West) Punjab and Bahawalpur, leaving India with a handle to “choke” lower riparian Pakistan. The issue was sought to be addressed through two Standstill Agreements concluded in December 1947 between the Chief Engineers of the two Punjab’s. They agreed to allow the existing water-sharing arrangements to continue till the following year. Meanwhile, relations between the two countries had soured following the first Kashmir war which broke out in October1947 and continued till January 1948 before Prime Minister Nehru sought the UN Security Council’s intervention. The Standstill Agreements expired on 31 March 1948, and the following day Indian Punjab cut off the water-flow to Pakistan on the ground that the canal colonies in Pakistan served by these head works did not pay the standard water dues. It was in the backdrop of this mutual acrimonyand stalemate that David Lilienthal, a former Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, suggested in 1951 that India and Pakistan should work out a programme jointly to develop and operatethe Indus river system perhaps with financial assistance from the World Bank. However, once it became clear that the joint Indus Engineering Corporation envisagedby Lilienthal to manage the Indus waters was unlikely to materialise, the Bank officials proposed to India and Pakistan division of the river in1954, a proposal which culminatedin the Indus Water Treaty(IWT) of 1961. The treaty laid down that the three eastern rivers of the Indus system (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) were to cater to India’s needs; and three western rivers (Jhelum, Chenab and Indus) were to meet Pakistan’s requirements.
Moreover, since both Chenab and Jhelum, with high hydropotential, flowed out of Kashmir, it was important to determine how India could use Chenab and Jhelum waters in a non consumptive way – without interfering with Pakistan’s right to those waters. This riddle was addressed by the stipulation that power could be generated and used in Indian Kashmir as long as it did not affect the quantum or timing of water flows to Pakistan
The Kashmir issue remains a hydra-headed problem, one that is marked by a territorial controversy, an ideological dispute, the question of self-determination, militancy, and a human rights dimension. But one critical aspect of this multifaceted muddle that often escapes our attention has been the complexities arising out of sharing of common river water resources by the “distant” neighbours and the associated institutional mechanisms.
The Indus River Basin not only cradled one of the world’s oldest civilisations, but the survival and sustenance of sizable communities in contemporary Pakistan and India also remain critically dependent on the river and its tributaries. The Indus network constitutes the lifeline of Pakistan where more than 90per cent of the land is semi-arid and nearly half of the population is employed in the agricultural sector. The river nourishes the water-deficient states of north-western India, notably Punjab, the “bread basket of India”. It originates in the Tibetan Plateau and along with its tributaries flows through Jammu and Kashmir before entering Pakistan. Thus the Partition of 1947 called for a division not simply of land and people, but also of waterways thereby posing a formidablechallenge to Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Chairman of the Border Commission. The dispute over sharing of Indus water came to the fore immediately after Partition because the existing irrigation canal head works remained in the Indian state of (East) Punjab, while the lands being irrigated by the river fell in Pakistan’s (West) Punjab and Bahawalpur, leaving India with a handle to “choke” lower riparian Pakistan. The issue was sought to be addressed through two Standstill Agreements concluded in December 1947 between the Chief Engineers of the two Punjab’s. They agreed to allow the existing water-sharing arrangements to continue till the following year. Meanwhile, relations between the two countries had soured following the first Kashmir war which broke out in October1947 and continued till January 1948 before Prime Minister Nehru sought the UN Security Council’s intervention. The Standstill Agreements expired on 31 March 1948, and the following day Indian Punjab cut off the water-flow to Pakistan on the ground that the canal colonies in Pakistan served by these head works did not pay the standard water dues. It was in the backdrop of this mutual acrimonyand stalemate that David Lilienthal, a former Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, suggested in 1951 that India and Pakistan should work out a programme jointly to develop and operatethe Indus river system perhaps with financial assistance from the World Bank. However, once it became clear that the joint Indus Engineering Corporation envisagedby Lilienthal to manage the Indus waters was unlikely to materialise, the Bank officials proposed to India and Pakistan division of the river in1954, a proposal which culminatedin the Indus Water Treaty(IWT) of 1961. The treaty laid down that the three eastern rivers of the Indus system (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) were to cater to India’s needs; and three western rivers (Jhelum, Chenab and Indus) were to meet Pakistan’s requirements.
Moreover, since both Chenab and Jhelum, with high hydropotential, flowed out of Kashmir, it was important to determine how India could use Chenab and Jhelum waters in a non consumptive way – without interfering with Pakistan’s right to those waters. This riddle was addressed by the stipulation that power could be generated and used in Indian Kashmir as long as it did not affect the quantum or timing of water flows to Pakistan
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